When a federal agency seeks to renew a state or territorial environmental permit, has it already made a decision that can be challenged in court? And does the permitting process satisfy the agency’s separate obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)?
Those questions are before the U.S. Supreme Court in Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guåhan, No. 25-579, argued on October 7, 2026. Although the dispute concerns munitions disposal on Guam, the decision may affect how federal agencies coordinate environmental review with permitting in Hawaiʻi. The Court has not yet ruled.
An Operational Decision Within a Permitting Process
In 2021, the Air Force applied to the Guam Environmental Protection Agency (Guam EPA) to renew its hazardous-waste permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The U.S. EPA authorizes states and territories to administer hazardous-waste programs under RCRA. The application concerned waste-munitions disposal at Tarague Beach, where open detonation continued, and proposed restarting long-inactive open burning.
Prutehi Guåhan, formerly Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian, challenged the Air Force’s failure to conduct NEPA review before deciding to continue the operations. The distinction between the Air Force’s operational choice and Guam EPA’s permitting decision became central to the case.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded. It recognized standing because NEPA review could influence disposal methods or location, making the alleged procedural injury traceable to the Air Force’s conduct. The court also held that the challenged decision was final and that RCRA did not displace NEPA. Its analysis accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true; the ruling allowed the claim to proceed without ordering a particular environmental impact statement (EIS) or deciding whether the practices were safe. Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 128 F.4th 1089 (9th Cir. 2025) (opinion).
When Does the Decision Become Reviewable?
The Administrative Procedure Act generally permits review of final agency action when no other adequate remedy exists in court. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (opinion), an action must complete the agency’s decisionmaking process and determine rights or obligations or produce legal consequences.
The Ninth Circuit majority found a settled operational choice and legal consequences, including extension of the existing permit. Judge VanDyke dissented: renewal implemented longstanding operations, and continued authorization derived from the existing permit. He did not reach NEPA displacement. Slip op. at 47–74.
That disagreement carries into the Supreme Court briefing. The government argues that an application begins a process in which Guam EPA may require changes or deny renewal. Prutehi Guåhan responds that the application memorializes the Air Force’s completed choice about methods and location, even though the regulator’s decision remains pending. The organization also relies on the extension of the existing permit. Brief for Petitioners at 18–19; Brief for Respondent at 13–17.
At argument, Justice Kagan questioned whether the government’s objection concerned the pleading or the contingency created by another regulator’s approval. She also questioned respondent about waiting until the permit issues. The exchanges illustrate the tension between reviewing an unsettled proposal too early and reviewing an operational choice after permitting has advanced. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–25, 56–58.
Does RCRA Review Replace NEPA Review?
If the challenged action is reviewable, the next question is whether RCRA’s specialized review displaces NEPA.
This argument concerns whether a separate NEPA review is required at all, not simply when a lawsuit may proceed. If the Court accepts the government’s position, RCRA’s hazardous-waste permitting process could substitute for NEPA review of the Air Force’s decision in this setting. If it rejects displacement, the Air Force could remain subject to both processes, assuming NEPA otherwise applies.
The Ninth Circuit rejected displacement because of differences in timing, alternatives, and agency roles: NEPA informs operational planning, while RCRA reviews the resulting permit request. Slip op. at 35–47.
The government argues that RCRA’s specific, comprehensive requirements displace NEPA’s general procedures in this setting. Prutehi Guåhan maintains that the statutes address different decisions and can operate together. Brief for Petitioners at 19–21; Brief for Respondent at 14–16.
Justice Gorsuch’s questions focused on whether the principle that a specific statute governs a general one requires a conflict between the statutes. The answer could help determine whether overlapping environmental protections alone justify displacement. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21.
The Ninth Circuit applied pre-2023 NEPA to the 2021 action. Slip op. at 8 n.3. Current projects require analysis of the governing statutory text.
Implications for Hawaiʻi Projects
For Hawaiʻi practitioners, the case highlights the need to identify both the federal decision subject to environmental review and the point at which it becomes judicially reviewable. The Court could resolve the case on finality without reaching displacement. Its reasoning may nevertheless affect project schedules, litigation exposure, and opportunities for public participation.
The timing question connects with my earlier Superferry discussion, which addressed environmental-review exemptions and procedural injury under Hawaiʻi law. That post describes the rules in effect in 2007. Although the governing law differs, both disputes concern when environmental review must inform an agency’s actions.
Identifying the relevant action also connects with my Ritz-Carlton Waikīkī discussion, which addressed project segmentation and remedies for deficient review. Prutehi Guåhan concerns finality and displacement, but likewise requires care in defining what is being challenged.





