Hawaiʻi Supreme Court Clarifies Burden of Proof in Land Use Boundary Interpretation Cases

On August 28, 2025, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued an opinion in Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State of Hawaiʻi Land Use Commission, SCOT-24-0000498, addressing how the Land Use Commission (LUC) must evaluate petitions for district boundary interpretation under Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules (HAR) § 15-15-22. 

The Court vacated the LUC’s denial of a landowner’s petition and clarified that the correct burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence, not a heightened standard.

Background 

Honoipu Hideaway, LLC owns 17.5 acres of littoral property in North Kohala, Hawaiʻi Island. Roughly 4.8 acres of the parcel lie within the Conservation District, as shown on the 1974 LUC district boundary map. 

The owner argued that the map contained a mistake: it followed the alignment of an old dirt road rather than a new road built in 1961, prior to the creation of the first LUC maps. According to the owner, correcting the boundary to reflect the road’s true location would shift 1.8 acres from the Conservation District to the Agricultural District. 

Honoipu petitioned the LUC for a declaratory order under HAR § 15-15-22, which allows boundary interpretation where uncertainty exists in a map. The LUC denied the petition, concluding that the evidence was not “conclusive” or “compelling” enough to prove a mapping error. Commissioners emphasized the high bar for moving land out of the Conservation District and suggested that a formal district boundary amendment would be the proper path. 

The Court’s Decision 

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that the LUC applied the wrong burden of proof. The Court reasoned:  

• Boundary interpretation is not a reclassification; it is a limited tool to resolve uncertainty in maps. Where uncertainty exists, the LUC may determine the correct location of district lines.  
• Under HAR § 15-15-59, the petitioner bears the burden of proof in LUC proceedings. 
• In administrative hearings, unless otherwise specified, the appropriate standard is preponderance of the evidence—meaning the petitioner must show it is more likely than not that their interpretation is correct. 
• The LUC erred by requiring “conclusive” or “compelling” proof, which is a higher standard not authorized by statute or rule. 
• Because the LUC’s use of a heightened standard prejudiced the petitioner’s rights, the Court vacated the order and remanded for new findings under the correct standard. 

Key Takeaways 

1. Preponderance standard governs: Absent rulemaking to the contrary, the LUC must evaluate evidence in boundary interpretation cases using the civil preponderance standard.  
2. Boundary interpretation vs. amendment: Interpretation is only available to resolve uncertainties or mapping errors; broader policy changes must go through the statutory boundary amendment process under HRS § 205-4.  
3. Practical impact: Landowners seeking to correct map errors face a lower evidentiary hurdle than previously suggested by the LUC. However, they still must provide persuasive evidence that an error exists. 
4. Agency discretion limited by law: Agencies cannot unilaterally impose heightened burdens without adopting rules through formal rulemaking.

By requiring the LUC to apply the preponderance standard, the Court ensures that landowners can pursue legitimate corrections to district maps without facing insurmountable evidentiary barriers. At the same time, the opinion reaffirms that genuine reclassifications of Conservation land must proceed through the rigorous boundary amendment process.

Hawaiʻi Supreme Court Reaffirms Limits on Collateral Land Use Challenges, but Preserves Path for Environmental Review Claims

On September 12, 2025, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued its decision in Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. v. State of Hawaiʻi (SCWC-16-0000444), addressing how neighbors may challenge zoning and environmental approvals for major projects. 

The case arose from a dispute over the Central Maui Regional Sports Complex, a 65-acre facility approved by the Maui Planning Commission in 2014 through a county special use permit (CUP). 

Background 

Residents opposed to the sports complex formed Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN) after the Planning Commission approved the CUP. Instead of intervening in the CUP process or filing a timely appeal under HRS § 91-14, MLN filed suit in circuit court, raising zoning, constitutional, and environmental claims. 

Both the circuit court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals dismissed most of the claims, concluding that MLN had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. 

Supreme Court’s Holding 

The Court largely agreed, but clarified important distinctions: 

• Zoning and Due Process Claims: Because MLN members received notice and attended the CUP hearing, they were required to intervene or appeal under HRS § 91-14. The Court reaffirmed that zoning challenges must be pursued through the administrative process, not through collateral lawsuits. 
• Declaratory Judgment Actions: The Court reaffirmed that HRS § 632-1 does not provide an alternative route when HRS § 91-14 offers a special statutory remedy. 
• Constitutional Environmental Claims (Art. XI, § 9): MLN argued that Hawaiʻi’s constitutional right to a “clean and healthful environment” provided direct access to court. The Court held that, to the extent such claims were based on zoning statutes (HRS chs. 46 and 205), they were still subject to the HRS § 632-1 limitation. But claims premised on HRS ch. 343 (HEPA) could proceed, because the legislature expressly gave courts jurisdiction under HRS § 343-7. 
• HEPA Claims: The Court held that the Planning Commission lacked authority to decide whether DLNR’s environmental review was sufficient. Circuit courts have original jurisdiction over HEPA challenges, and dismissal of those claims was error. 

Key Takeaways

1. Timely Appeals Are Critical: When a permit is issued after a public hearing, opponents must intervene or appeal under HRS § 91-14. Collateral lawsuits are barred. 
2. Declaratory Relief Is Not a Shortcut: HRS § 632-1 cannot be used to sidestep the administrative appeal process. 
3. Environmental Review Is Different: HEPA challenges remain viable in circuit court, even when project permits are otherwise shielded by the exhaustion doctrine. 
4. Article XI, Section 9 Enforcement: Hawaiʻi’s constitutional environmental right continues to provide an independent basis for judicial review, but its scope depends on the underlying statute.  

This decision reaffirms that permits issued after contested case hearings are secure against collateral zoning challenges, provided proper procedures are followed. It underscores the importance of timely participation in administrative hearings, while preserving a pathway for judicial review of environmental assessments under HEPA.

Hawaiʻi Supreme Court: Ritz-Carlton Waikīkī Towers Were Improperly Segmented Under HEPA, and Developer Must Pay Union’s Fees

On February 21, 2025, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued a decision in Unite Here! Local 5 v. PACREP LLC (SCAP-22-0000601), holding that the environmental review for the Ritz-Carlton Residences towers at 2121 and 2139 Kūhiō Avenue in Waikīkī was improperly segmented in violation of the Hawaiʻi Environmental Policy Act (HEPA), HRS chapter 343.

 

The Court later followed up on September 11, 2025, awarding Local 5 more than $112,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs against the project developer, PACREP LLC, under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine.  

Background 

PACREP LLC and its affiliate PACREP 2 LLC developed the two Ritz-Carlton Residences towers in Waikīkī. The City and County of Honolulu’s Department of Planning and Permitting (DPP) accepted separate Final Environmental Assessments (FEAs) for each tower and issued findings of no significant impact (FONSIs). 

Unite Here! Local 5, a labor union representing hotel and restaurant workers, filed lawsuits challenging the sufficiency of the FEAs under HEPA. Local 5 argued that the two towers should have been reviewed together, because the projects were interdependent: 

• they shared a podium, amenities, and 
• infrastructure, and 2139 could not have been developed without 2121. 

The union also raised concerns that the projects could be converted to permanent residences, undermining promised job creation. 

The circuit court ruled in favor of PACREP and the City, but Local 5 appealed.

The Court’s February 2025 Decision 

Whether PACREP improperly segmented the Ritz-Carlton projects into two separate environmental reviews and whether the case was moot because the towers were already built and sold. 

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that: 

• Not Moot: The case was not moot even though the projects were completed. Courts can still order effective relief, including additional environmental review, and the public interest exception to mootness applied. 
• Improper Segmentation: PACREP improperly segmented the environmental review. Applying the “double independent utility test” adopted in Kiaʻi Wai o Waiʻaleʻale v. Department of Water, 151 Haw. 442, 517 P.3d 725 (2022), the Court found that 2121 was a necessary precedent for 2139 and that both towers should have been analyzed as one project. 
• Remedy: Remedies for HEPA violations are a matter of equitable discretion. Courts need not invalidate permits or order demolition of completed projects, but must ensure that environmental impacts—including economic and social effects—are properly disclosed. The case was remanded to the circuit court to determine whether the FEAs sufficiently analyzed the projects together, and, if not, whether a new EA or EIS is required. In a notable passage, the Court emphasized that PACREP’s concealment of its plans for the second tower from its own consultants and from DPP was “not pono.”   

The Court’s September 2025 Fee Decision 

After prevailing on the main issues, Local 5 moved for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

• Statutory Claim (HRS § 607-25): The Court denied fees under HRS § 607-25(e)(1), finding the request premature because it remains to be determined on remand whether PACREP lacked required approvals. 
• Private Attorney General Doctrine: The Court awarded fees under the PAG doctrine, which allows fee-shifting where litigation vindicates important public policies. The Court found that: 
• Local 5 was the prevailing party. 
• The case vindicated significant public policies under HEPA and the Hawaiʻi Constitution’s environmental protections.  
• Private enforcement was necessary, as the developer’s improper segmentation would have gone unaddressed without Local 5’s litigation. 
• The ruling benefits the public by clarifying HEPA standards and remedies. 

Because PACREP concealed its plans and bore primary responsibility for the violation, the Court ordered PACREP—not the City—to pay. Local 5 was awarded $112,721.10, consisting of $100,774.65 in attorneys’ fees, $5,692.50 for preparing the fee motion, $5,016.73 in general excise tax, and $1,237.22 in costs. 

Key Takeaways 

1. Segmentation under HEPA: Developers cannot divide interdependent projects into separate environmental reviews. If one project is a necessary precedent for another, they must be analyzed together. 
2. Mootness and Completed Projects: HEPA litigation does not become moot simply because a project is finished. Courts retain equitable discretion to order further review or mitigation.  
3. Economic and Social Impacts: HEPA’s scope includes not just ecological effects, but also economic, social, and health impacts. Job creation claims and potential residential conversions must be properly addressed. 
4. Private Enforcement: Unions, community groups, and other private parties play a role in enforcing environmental laws, and successful litigants may recover attorneys’ fees under the PAG doctrine. 
5. Developers Bear the Risk: Where developers conceal plans or improperly segment environmental review, they may face both litigation risk and fee awards. 

The PACREP decisions reinforce that segmentation is impermissible and that completed projects are not immune from environmental review and costly penalties.

Hawaiʻi Supreme Court Defines Limits of Governor’s Emergency Powers in Affordable Housing Case

On September 11, 2025, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued a significant opinion in Nakoa v. Governor of the State of Hawaiʻi, SCAP-24-0000401, clarifying the scope of gubernatorial emergency powers under Hawaiʻi’s emergency management statute, HRS chapter 127A. The case arose from challenges to Governor Josh Green’s series of emergency proclamations aimed at expediting affordable housing. 

Background 

Beginning in July 2023, Governor Green declared an “emergency” based on the state’s longstanding affordable housing shortage. Through consecutive 60-day proclamations—now numbering fifteen—the Governor suspended a wide range of state and county laws, including statutes on environmental review, historic preservation, zoning, and procurement. Early proclamations also established a “Build Beyond Barriers Working Group” with authority to certify housing projects for expedited approval. 

Community members challenged these actions, arguing that lack of affordable housing is not the type of “emergency” envisioned by the statute, and that the proclamations unlawfully rewrote or suspended laws reserved to the Legislature. 

The Court’s Framework 

The Court rejected a narrow reading of “emergency.” Longstanding problems, the Court held, can reach a crisis point that qualifies as an emergency under HRS chapter 127A. At the same time, judicial review remains available even though the statute designates the governor as the “sole judge” of emergencies. 

Most importantly, the Court adopted a dual test for reviewing gubernatorial emergency actions: 

1. The proclamation must be rationally related to public health, safety, and welfare; and 
2. The measures taken must be reasonably necessary to address the emergency. 

This test is more demanding than ordinary “rational basis” review of legislation, requiring a factual foundation and proportionality between the emergency declared and the government’s response. 

Application to the Housing Proclamations 

Applying this framework, the Court drew a sharp line between the early and later proclamations: 

• First through Fifth Proclamations (2023–early 2024): Invalid in scope. Although the housing crisis rationally related to health, safety, and welfare, the creation of a new working group and the opening of fast-track certification to all housing projects—not just affordable housing—was not reasonably necessary. The Court declined to retroactively void projects already approved, but emphasized these actions exceeded statutory authority. 
• Sixth through Fifteenth Proclamations (Feb. 2024–present): Valid. By narrowing eligibility to affordable housing and transferring decision-making back to the Hawaiʻi Housing Finance and Development Corporation, these proclamations were reasonably tailored to the emergency. The most recent version, the Fourteenth Proclamation (July 2025), expires September 26, 2025. The Court also rejected claims that the proclamations violated separation of powers or Hawaiʻi’s constitutional suspension of laws clause, holding that HRS chapter 127A lawfully delegates authority to suspend laws and adopt rules during emergencies. 

Key Takeaways 

• Judicial Review Standard Set: Hawaiʻi courts will now assess emergency proclamations under a dual test—rational relation and reasonable necessity. 
• Limits on Emergency Powers: Broad suspensions of laws and new governance structures untethered to the specific emergency will not be upheld. 
• Affordable Housing as Emergency: The Court recognized that chronic social issues, if severe enough, can constitute “emergencies,” but responses must still be proportional. 
• Prospective Guidance: While early proclamations exceeded authority, they are not retroactively invalidated. The ruling provides prospective guidance for governors, mayors, and litigants. 

Implications 

For land use practitioners, developers, and agencies, this decision means that emergency proclamations can temporarily override zoning, environmental, and procurement laws, but only if narrowly tailored to the emergency at hand. Affordable housing qualifies as such an emergency, but the Court has signaled that executive responses must be carefully limited to avoid becoming substitutes for ordinary legislation.

SCOTUS Refocuses NEPA Review in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado

On May 29, 2025, in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s invalidation of the Surface Transportation Board’s approval of an 88-mile railway connecting Utah’s Uinta Basin to the national freight network. The ruling carries major implications for how federal agencies and project proponents approach environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

Source: Final EIS for the proposed Uinta Basin Railway

The Court’s decision reinforces a more deferential posture toward agency discretion in NEPA cases, emphasizing the procedural (rather than substantive) character of the statute and narrowing the required scope of environmental review to focus on the “proposed action” itself. This shift is particularly relevant to project proponents who face litigation challenging the sufficiency of an environmental impact statement (EIS) based on indirect or speculative environmental effects.

The Issue Before the Court

The Surface Transportation Board prepared a comprehensive EIS analyzing the construction and operation of the Uinta Basin Railway. While the EIS addressed numerous impacts—including effects on wetlands, wildlife, land use, air quality, and recreation—it noted, but did not fully analyze, the potential environmental consequences of upstream oil drilling and downstream refining that could result from expanded oil transport enabled by the railway.

The D.C. Circuit vacated the Board’s approval, concluding that it had failed to take the required “hard look” under NEPA at these foreseeable, indirect impacts. Specifically, it faulted the Board for not conducting a more extensive evaluation of increased oil drilling in the Uinta Basin and refining activities in Gulf Coast states. See Eagle Cty. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 82 F.4th 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

Majority Opinion: Project-Based Review and Substantial Deference

Writing for the Court, Justice Kavanaugh reversed (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett). He held that the D.C. Circuit misapplied NEPA by failing to defer to the Board’s reasonable judgment about the scope and detail of the EIS. The Court underscored three key principles:

1. NEPA is procedural, not substantive. It requires agencies to prepare a detailed statement addressing significant environmental effects and feasible alternatives, but does not dictate the outcome. NEPA “does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.” Slip op. at 6.

2. Agency discretion in defining the scope of the EIS is entitled to substantial deference. Courts should not “micromanage” agencies’ decisions about the breadth of their NEPA analyses. “The only role for a court is to confirm that the agency has addressed environmental consequences and feasible alternatives as to the relevant project.” Id. at 9 (internal quotes omitted).

3. The focus must remain on the “proposed action.” Environmental effects from projects that are “separate in time or place” and beyond the agency’s regulatory control fall outside the required scope of NEPA review. “[T]he fact that the project might foreseeably lead to the construction or increased use of a separate project does not mean the agency must consider that separate project’s environmental effects.” Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).

The majority explicitly rejected a “but-for” causation standard: “[A] mere ‘but for’ causal relationship is insufficient to make an agency responsible for a particular effect.” Id. at 18 (internal citations omitted).

Concurring Opinion: A More Statutory Approach to NEPA Limits

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, concurred in the judgment but emphasized a different rationale. Rather than focusing on agency discretion or the risk of judicial overreach, the concurrence concluded that NEPA did not require review of oil drilling and refining impacts, because the Board lacked the legal authority to reject the railway project based on those consequences.

Under Public Citizen, NEPA does not require analysis of environmental effects if the agency has no power to prevent or mitigate them. The Board, as a federal railroad regulator, could not lawfully deny the project to prevent oil-related emissions. Thus, it bore no responsibility under NEPA for analyzing them. See Slip op. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) at 11.

The concurrence also cautioned against policy-driven analysis: 

I agree with the Court that the Surface Transportation Board would not be responsible for the harms caused by the oil industry, even though the railway it approved would deliver oil to refineries and spur drilling in the Uinta Basin. I reach that conclusion because, under its organic statute, the Board had no authority to reject petitioners’ application on account of the harms third parties would cause with products transported on the proposed railway. The majority takes a different path, unnecessarily grounding its analysis largely in matters of policy.

Id. at 1.

Key Takeaways

Points to consider for those navigating the environmental review process:

• Clarify the “proposed action” early. The Court’s emphasis on NEPA’s textually mandated focus on the “project at hand” makes it critical to define the scope of action in a defensible way.

• Document jurisdictional boundaries. Agencies should explain in the record when potential impacts fall outside their authority to regulate or control.

• Don’t overextend the EIS. The Court explicitly discouraged including distant or speculative impacts to avoid “delay upon delay.” Slip op. at 13.

• Build a reasonable record—not an exhaustive one. “Even a deficient EIS does not necessarily require vacating an agency’s project approval, absent reason to believe that the agency might disapprove the project if it added more to the EIS.” Id. at 2–3.

A Shift in Judicial Posture on NEPA

This ruling reflects a broader reorientation in the Court’s administrative law doctrine. The majority criticizes “overly intrusive (and unpredictable) review in NEPA cases” and seeks to bring judicial oversight “back in line with the statutory text and common sense.” Id. at 12.

"When a party argues that an agency action was arbitrary and capricious due to a deficiency in an EIS, the reviewing court must account for the fact that NEPA is a purely procedural statute." Id. at 9. The NEPA "Hard Look" review is still valid. The Court’s deference under NEPA is procedural and factual—related to how thoroughly an agency considered environmental effects—not to how it interprets legal provisions.

For developers, public agencies, and infrastructure advocates, this means courts may now be less receptive to claims that agencies failed to evaluate cumulative or indirect effects that are tenuously related to the federal action under review.

Still, the concurring opinion reminds us that NEPA's reach remains contingent on the specific statutory authority of the reviewing agency. This keeps the door open to more expansive NEPA analysis where an agency possesses broader regulatory discretion under its authorizing statute.

As always, rigorous administrative records, clearly defined project boundaries, and well-supported explanations will remain key to defensible agency decisions.

For additional legal updates and analysis on environmental review, permitting, and infrastructure projects in Hawaiʻi and beyond, visit HawaiiLandUseLaw.com.

Hawaiʻi Supreme Court Provides Useful Insight for EIS Preparers in Upholding Aquarium Fishing Permits

On August 28, 2024, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kaupiko v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, marking another chapter in the ongoing legal battles over commercial aquarium fish collection from state coastal waters.

Background

In 2017, the Court held in Umberger v. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 140 Hawaiʻi 500 (2017) that commercial aquarium collection permitting is not exempt from review under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 343, the Hawaiʻi Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). The Court ruled that such permits are not merely “minor alterations” to state waters, stating:

“A permit for extraction of an unlimited number of aquatic life cannot be said to constitute only a ‘minor alteration’ in the condition of state waters and submerged lands.”

Following the Umberger decision, the Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to obtain permits for commercial aquarium fishing in the West Hawaiʻi Reef Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA). The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) rejected the EIS for fourteen specific deficiencies. PIJAC revised the EIS, published it, and resubmitted it to BLNR for acceptance. However, a BLNR vote to consider the EIS ended in a 3-3 tie. Under HRS § 343-5(e), such a tie results in the EIS being “deemed accepted.” HRS § 343-5(e) provides,

“The final statement shall be deemed to be accepted if the agency fails to accept or not accept the final statement within thirty days after receipt of the final statement.”

While the case was pending, BLNR authorized limited commercial aquarium collection permits on August 23, 2024.

Supreme Court Decision

The Court addressed three substantive issues on appeal, holding:

1. The State was a proper defendant in the case and was required to defend the EIS.
2. A reviewing court must apply the “rule of reason” alongside HEPA’s content requirements when evaluating an EIS.
3. The EIS met HEPA’s content requirements and contained sufficient information for BLNR to make an informed decision.

Key Holdings

1. The State as Proper Defendant

The State argued that it should not be required to defend the EIS because the EIS was accepted by operation of law due to the tie vote, not through an affirmative agency decision. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that acceptance under HRS § 343-5(e) is still an agency action and subject to judicial review. The Court clarified that the State, through BLNR, remained responsible for the adequacy of the EIS, even in cases of deemed acceptance.

2. The Rule of Reason in EIS Review

The Court reaffirmed its holding in Price v. Obayashi Hawaiʻi Corp., 81 Hawaiʻi 171 (1996), emphasizing that the sufficiency of an EIS is guided by the rule of reason. Under this standard:

"An EIS need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possible details bearing on the proposed action but will be upheld as adequate if it has been compiled in good faith and sets forth sufficient information to enable the decision-maker to consider fully the environmental factors involved."

The Court outlined steps for reviewing an EIS:

• HEPA Content Review. Evaluate whether the EIS satisfies the environmental factors in HAR § 11-200.1-24, ensuring it provides sufficient information for reasoned decision-making.
• Response to Deficiencies. Ensure that the final EIS addresses initial reasons for rejection and responds to substantive feedback, as required under HAR § 11-200.1-27.
• Practical Inquiry. Consider whether alleged HEPA violations impede informed decision-making or public comment.

3. Use of Appendices in EIS Documentation

Opponents argued that HEPA requires substantive comments to be incorporated directly into the body of the EIS. The Court disagreed, holding that appendices may contain important information, provided the EIS’s body guides readers to relevant appendices. The Court stated:

“The purpose of the EIS here was to ensure that BLNR made a fully informed decision as to the environmental impact of commercial aquarium permits in the WHRFMA. That purpose is not defeated when important information is held in an appendix.”

The Court concluded that the EIS met HEPA’s requirements because the body and appendices together enabled BLNR to make a reasoned decision.

Lessons from Kaupiko

The Kaupiko decision underscores the importance of an EIS that balances legal sufficiency with practical usability. Key takeaways for preparing an enforceable EIS include:

• Address All Concerns. Ensure that all substantive feedback and prior deficiencies are addressed thoroughly.
• Structure with Clarity. Use appendices effectively, while ensuring the body of the EIS directs readers to relevant content.
• Focus on Decision-Making. The overarching goal is to enable informed and reasoned decision-making based on the environmental factors at issue.

This decision reaffirms HEPA’s role in safeguarding environmental and public interests while balancing procedural fairness for applicants.

Federal Government Proposes Expansion of the Papahānaumokuākea National Marine Sanctuary

The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the proposed designation of the Papahānaumokuākea National Marine Sanctuary emphasizes both ecological and cultural stewardship and reflects the strategic geopolitical considerations of expanding federal oversight in the Pacific. By formalizing protections for the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA), the federal government strengthens its presence in a region of increasing global significance while respecting state sovereignty.

The proposed sanctuary encompassed in Alternative 1 (the preferred alternative) is approximately 582,570 square miles (439,910 square nmi). It would be one of the largest marine protected areas globally. This expansion coincides with U.S. efforts to reinforce its strategic position in the Pacific, countering the growing influence of nations like China. Papahānaumokuākea lies at the nexus of U.S. Pacific territories, linking Hawaiʻi, Guam, and broader maritime security interests. By invoking the NMSA, the federal government enhances its capacity to regulate illegal fishing, resource extraction, and unauthorized vessel traffic, affirming its stewardship over a significant portion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Portions of the area now known as Papahānaumokuākea have been federally protected in some form since 1903, when President Theodore Roosevelt first placed Midway Atoll under the control of the Navy. Management of Papahānaumokuākea and its boundaries were further addressed by Presidents Clinton (Executive Orders 13158 and 13196), Bush (Presidential Proclamations 8031 and 8112), and Obama (Presidential Proclamation 9478). Under a Memorandum of Agreement entered into in 2017, the Monument is administered jointly by four co-trustees—the Department of Commerce (including NOAA), the Department of the Interior, the State of Hawaiʻi (including the Department of Land and Natural Resources), and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.

Papahānaumokuākea demonstrates U.S. leadership in marine conservation, aligning with international agreements like the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. The sanctuary sets a benchmark for sustainable resource management and underscores the U.S.’s commitment to preserving indigenous and cultural heritage. By integrating Native Hawaiian practices into its management, the U.S. bolsters its reputation as a partner that respects cultural and environmental priorities in regions where local relationships are critical to strategic goals.

The FEIS carefully navigates federal expansion while respecting state sovereignty and local concerns. State officials opposed extending sanctuary boundaries toward the main Hawaiian Islands, citing limited community support. Keeping the eastern boundary at Nihoa Island reflects the federal government’s commitment to preserving the State of Hawaiʻi’s marine jurisdiction and protecting traditional and commercial fishing practices near the main islands. This balance ensures collaboration between federal, state, and local stakeholders.

The proposed Papahānaumokuākea National Marine Sanctuary highlights the federal government’s strategic role in marine conservation and maritime security in a geopolitically significant region. By reinforcing protections within the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, the U.S. enhances its environmental leadership while respecting state sovereignty and community needs. This approach provides a model for balancing conservation and geopolitical strategy.

For more insights on this and other legal developments, visit hawaiilanduselaw.com.